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At common law interest was a basis for disqualification of a
witness. Wigmore states the reason for the rule in the form of
a syllogism, both premises of which he holds to be false. "Total
exclusion from the stand is the proper safeguard against a false
decision whenever the persons offered are of a class specially
likely to speak falsely; Persons having a pecuniary interest in
the event of a cause are specially likely to speak falsely; There-
fore, such persons should be totally excluded."1 In every juris-
diction in the United States interest as a basis for disqualifica-
tion has been expressly abolished by statute.' However, the
principle of the discarded rule has been perpetuated to some
extent by a statutory exception excluding the testimony of the
survivor of a transaction with a decedent when offered against
the latter's estate.' This exception prevails in all but six states
of the United States.
The Ohio Code provides, "A party shall not testify when
the adverse party is the guardian or trustee of either a deaf and
dumb or an insane person, or of a child of a deceased person, or
is an executor or administrator, or claims or defends as heir,
grantee, assignee, devisee, or legatee of a deceased person ex-
cept... '" (There are eight exceptions, each of which will be
treated in order later in the article). Since the statute provides
that a party shall not testify it is evident that a person who is
not a party is competent to testify although the action is against
a representative of a protected class.' Persons, not parties to
the action, are competent witnesses although interested in the
result of the suit as heirs, relatives, or devisees of the decedent7
or relatives of the party adverse to decedent.8 It has been held
1 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd Ed., Sec. 576.
2 Wigmore on Evidence, supra, Sec. 576.
3 Wigmore on Evidence, supra, Sec. S78.
4 Arizona, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Virginia.
5 Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11495.6 Hess v. ClZtz, 8 Ohio App. 57, 29 Ohio C.D. 497, 28 O.C.A. 81 (1917); MrYres v.
Walker, 9 Ohio St. 559 (1859); Parker v. Mull. L. Ins. Co., 23 Ohio App. 535, 156
N.E. 231 (19z5)j Clarkson v Ruan, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 829 (1879)-
7Rowland Adm. v. Griffiths, Adm., 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 619 (1878); Keyes v. Gore,
42 Ohio St. 211 (1884); Powell, Admx. v. Powell, Admx., 78 Ohio St. 331, 85 N.E.
541 (59o8).5 Hess v. Clatz, supra; Barnes v. Christy, 1o2 Ohio St. 16o, 131 N.E. 352 (9zi);
Schulte v. Hagemeyer, 16 Ohio App. i (Igzz), motion to certify overruled, zo Ohio L.
Rep. x475 Clarkson v. Ruan, supra, note 6.
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that officers and agents of the adverse party are not disqualified
by the statute. The persons disqualified must not only be par-
ties but they must be real parties."° Persons who are made
parties to the suit and are interested in it are still competent
witnesses unless they have power to control such suit." Thus a
witness cannot be excluded from testifying by merely making
him a nominal party." Moreover, the party must be adverse
to the representative party to be barred," as determined by his
actual, legal interests and not by his nominal position as plain-
tiff or defendant.'" The question as to whether an adverse
interest exists arises in a variety of situations. A party defendant
who would be entitled to the benefit of a defense established
by his testimony has been held to be a real party having an ad-
verse interest." But the husband of an heir joined with her as
party because of her coverture has no adverse interest as he is
merely a nominal party. 6 Moreover, in an action against the
administrator of an estate to recover specific personal property,
the heirs of decedent are not necessary parties and their interests
are not adverse.' Co-parties may have adverse interests. Thus
a person whose interests were joint with the plaintiff's but who
refused to join and was made a codefendant was held incom-
petent to testify against his codefendant. 8 Where co-parties
have similar interests neither may testify against the represen-
tative party." But if their interests are dissimilar one may
testify to a subject in which he has no interest.2 " And if a de-
fendant has a valid defense he is not a party and is competent
'Parker v. Mul. Life Ins. Co., supra, note 6; Milling v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St. 270,
79 N.E. 478, ix6 Am. St. Rep. 741 (i9o6); Brocalsa Chemical Co. v. Langsenkamp,
3z Fed. (2d) 7Z5 (1929).
"' Wolf v. Powner 30 Ohio St. 472 (1876)i Loney v. Walkey, Admr., IOZ Ohio
St. 1S, 13o N.E. x58 (1921).
"' Rowland, Admr. v. Griffiths, Adnir., supra, note 7; Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 123 (1924).
1'Mathcws v. Markey, IS Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 413, 33 Ohio C.D. 127 (xigo); Bro-
calsa Chemical Co. v. LangsenkaMnp, 3z Fed. (2d) 725 (1929); Loney v. Walkey, Admr.,
supra.1 3 Re Runyan, 4 Ohio N.P. 335, 7 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) Z36 (1897); Glenn v. Hoff-
man, z Ohio Dec. Rep. 131 (1859); Wolf v. Powner, supra, note Io.
" Glenn v. Hoffman, supra, note 13; Wolf v. Powner, supra, note io Baker v.
Kellogg, 29 Ohio St. 663 (1876)i Brinker v. Schreiber, 8 Ohio Dec. Rep. 759, 9 Bull.
z94 (1883).
11 Baker v. Jerome, So Ohio St. 68z, 35 N.E. 1113 (1893).
10 Wolf v. Powner, supra, note 10.
17 Loney v. Walkey, Admr., supra, note 1o.
" Hubbell v. Hubbell, 2Z Ohio St. zo8 (187).
"'Fenton v. Askew, 1x9 Ohio St. 603, z65 N.E. 301 (19z9).
"' Glenn v. Hoffman, supra, note 13.
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to testify for his codefendant.2 Similarly, a joint defendant
who fails to set up a defense is a competent witness for his co-
defendant.22
The statute enumerates certain classes of persons who are
to be within its protection. The first of these is "the guardian
or trustee of either a deaf and dumb or an insane person, or of
a child of a deceased person."'" The evident purpose of this
provision is to prevent a party from testifying when the adverse
party represents a person incompetent to be a witness because
of physical or mental infirmity. 4 Many cases have held that
an imbecile is included as an insane person.25 In applying this
provision the court has held that where the plaintiff in an action
on a note is guardian of an insane person, one maker is not a
competent witness for his codefendant, the other maker."8 And
where an infant brings action by next of friend for damages,
for personal injuries, and imbecility on the part of the defend-
ant has intervened, the infant is incompetent as a witness as he
is party plaintiff.2 Moreover, a guardian of an imbecile, in an
accounting before the probate court, is an incompetent witness
to prove an alleged claim for services rendered by him to and
for the ward prior to the date of his appointment as guardian."
But the section does not render incompetent the trustee of an
estate and the beneficiaries under such trust in an action between
such beneficiaries to determine the interests of each.28
Executors and administrators constitute the second pro-
tected class. They are not made incompetent and may waive
the privilege of excluding the opposing party." But in an action
by one executor or administrator against another neither is com-
petent to testify against the other to any matter not within the
exceptions without mutual waiver." And in an action against
an executor on an oral contract made by a father with his daugh-
"2Bonte's Admr. v. Hinman, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 1173, 9 Bull. 295 reversed on other
grounds, 14 Bull. 369.
"RBaker v. Kellogg, supra, note 14; Brinker v. Schreiber, supra, note sn-; Bell v.
Wilson, 17 Ohio St. 640 (x867).
2 Ohio Gen. Code, 1495.
2, Ross v. Todd, 4 Ohio C.C. z, 2 Ohio C.D. 385 (1889).
2' Ross v. Todd, supra, note 24; McNicol v. Johnson, 29 Ohio St. 8 (1876); Ran-
som v. Haberer & Co., 13 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 52; 22 Ohio C.D. 592, ffad., 8 Ohio St.
483, 98 N.E. 1134.
"' Baker v. Jerome, So Ohio St. 682, 35 N.E. i113 (1893).
2' Ransom v. Haberer & Co., supra, note 25.
"SIn re Estate of Oliver, 9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 178 (i909).
" Miller v. Miller, 13 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) i, App. iS Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 481, 24 Ohio
C.D. 4, modified 88 O.S. 609, 90 O.S. 28.
Doughman v. Doaghman, 22 Ohio St. 658 (287!).
"Farley v. Lisey, SS Ohio St. 627,45 N.E. 1103 (897).
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ter, the latter is disqualified to prove the existence of the con-
tract. 2 A purchaser of a lot cannot testify to representations
made by the vendor and agent, since deceased, regarding such
tract.3 But in an action by a corporation against an executor,
the manager may testify to facts occurring before the death."4
And where the representative of a deceased person, party to an
action, examines as a witness, the adverse party with reference
to any conversation, admission, or transaction with deceased, he
thereby waives the incompetency of such adverse party to tes-
tify in his own behalf." A widow cannot object to a creditor
testifying to facts to reduce her year's allowance on the ground
that she is an administratrix, 0 although probably she could ob-
ject on the ground that she is an heir." Nor can a party who
is disqualified from testifying because the opposing party is an
executor or administrator by cross-examining such representa-
tive as to conversations and transactions, thus make competent
his own testimony as to the same. 38
The other classes protected are heirs, grantees, assignees,
devisees or legatees of a deceased person. A plaintiff in an
action to correct a deed brought against the grantor's heirs is
incompetent to testify to acts and declarations of grantor at the
time of and after execution of the deed." The word "grantee"
is confined to its ordinary meaning of transferee of real property
or such incorporeal rights as properly lie in grant.4" It has been
held that the statute relates only to cases where the matter in
litigation is directly involved as where the tide to the thing
granted is directly attacked.4 Previously the statute did not
expressly include assignees and the courts then held that an
assignee of a chose in action was not included in the word
"grantee." 42 An amendment resulted specifically including
"assignee."1
There are eight enumerated exceptions to the general rule
of exclusion of adverse parties in actions by or against a represen-
3 Lcmunyon v. Newcomb, Extr., izo Ohio St. 55, x6S N.E. 533 (1929)- In an
action for breach of contract for services to deceased plaintiff cannot testify. House v.
Thompson, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 271 (1929)5 Prince v. Abersold, X23 Ohio St. 464, 175 N.E.
86z (93)i Fenton v. Askcw, z19 Ohio St. 603, x65 N.E. 301.
5
" Floro v. Wadsz orth,43 Ohio App. I, i~z N.E. 331 (1929).
"' Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St. 270 (19o6) 5 79 N.E. 478.
"Stream v. Barnard, 20 Ohio St. 206, z65 N.E. 727 (1929).
3
rRe Rabe, sa Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 59o ( 9oz).
a7 Ohio Jur. Sec. 193.
Hickox v. Rogers, 33 Ohio App. 97, 168 N.E. 750 (1928).
Kilbourn v. Fury, z6 Ohio St. 153 (x875).
o Elliott v. Shaw, 3z Ohio St. 431 (1877).
"Sternberger v. Hanna, 42 Ohio St. 305 (1884).
42 Elliott v. Shaw-, supra.
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tative party. They are intended to provide for particular situ-
ations where the admissibility of the testimony would tend to
secure rather than to prevent equality." The exceptions are:
(i) "The facts which occurred after the appointment of the
guardian or trustee of an insane person, and, in the other cases,
after the time the decedent, grantor, assignor, or testator
died :"'4 The adverse party is made incompetent only as to facts
occurring before death of decedent or appointment of the
guardian.45 The operation of the statute is not limited merely to
transactions with the decedent but applies to facts, circumstances
or acts, though independent of human agency.46
(2) "When the action or proceeding relates to a contract
made through an agent by a person since deceased, and the
agent is competent to testify as a witness, a party may testify on
the same subject. ' 4' In this situation there is no reason to ex-
dude the testimony, for the agent can testify as fully as to the
matter as could the principal if he were living.48 Thus a tenant
suing his landlord's estate for an injury due to a falling ceiling
is a competent witness to testify to conversations had with the
agent of the landlord thereto, where all his dealings were with
the agent who is alive and testified for the estate.49 If the agent
has died prior to the trial the adverse party is dearly incompe-
tent."' But the fact that the estate failed to examine the agent
is of no importance.51 These rules apply only when the agent is
not a party. When he is a party his testimony is subject to the
same tests as that of other parties.52
(3) "If a party, or one having a direct interest, testifies to
transactions or conversations with another party, the latter may
testify as to the same transactions or conversations."" Thus if
an executor testifies to interviews with the adverse party, the
latter may testify fully to the same, 4 or if an administrator
"
5 Rankin v. Hannan, 38 Ohio St. 438 (188z); Cochran v. Almack, 39 Ohio St. 314
(1883).
+' Ohio Gen Code, 11495.
*' Glenn v. Hoffman, supra, note 13; Meier v. Herancourt, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 1164(s88z).
4
"Hall v. Crain, z Ohio Dec. Rep. 453, West. L.M. 137 (z86o); Wehrmann v.
Beech, 7 C.C. (N.S.) 367, x8 Ohio C.D. iz8 (i9o6).
4' Ohio Gen. Code 15495-
48 Union Trust Co. v. Johnson, 42 Ohio App. 301, z8z N.E. 137
, 
35 O.L.R. 646
(1931) motion to certify overruled Jan. 2o, 19325 Hoyt v. Heister, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 42o,
2 Bull. Supp. 5 (I877).
'o Union Trust Co. v Johnson, supra, note 48.
g°Floro v. Wadsworth, 43 Ohio App. i, s8z N.E. 594, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 700 (I929).
' Hoyt v. Heister, supra, note 48.
12 Roberts v. Remy, 56 Ohio St. 249, 46 N.E. io66 (1897).
Ohio Gen. Code 11495.
14 Leonard v. State, 3 Ohio App. 313, 2o Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 340 (1914).
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testifies in his own behalf to a certain conversation and an agree-
ment between his intestate and the adverse party, the other
party may testify to the same." If a person has been improperly
made a party, the fact that he has testified will not enable the
adverse party to testify."6 Nor can the adverse party by calling
the representative party and cross-examining him, make his own
client's testimony competent." "As such mere formal or un-
necessary parties are not to be excluded from testifying, so a
plaintiff who makes such persons parties, or allows them to
remain as such, can not, if they are called as witnesses, avail
himself of this provision to testify to the same transaction on
the mere ground that they are parties to the record."58 How-
ever, a widow who joined as defendant in an action against her
husband's administrators and testified to a transaction, has a
direct interest in the suit because of her right to a distributive
share and therefore the adverse party is made competent to
testify as to the same transaction."
(4) "If a party offers evidence of conversations or admis-
sions of the opposite party, the latter may testify concerning the
same conversations or admissions.""0 The exception applies
only to oral conversations and admissions. 1 The word "admis-
sion" denotes a statement or declaration made by one person
alone while "conversation" designates an oral discourse between
two or more persons. 2 The exception includes the case where
the representative party cross-examines the adverse party as a
witness, with reference to any conversation or admission. 3 Be-
fore statements made by a witness can be given in evidence to
impeach him he must first be interrogated as to the same and
if the witness has since died, they cannot be given." Declara-
tions against interest of a deceased person, either oral or in
writing, binding him or his estate may be given in evidence
against his personal representative in an action for services
o Rankin v. Hannan, 38 Ohio St. 438, 8 W.L.B. 244 (s88z).
Williams v. Longlcy, 3 Ohio C.C. 5o8, z Ohio C.D. 292 (188S).
7 Hichox v. Rogers, 33 Ohio App. 97, x68 N.E. 750 (1928).
Williams v. Longlcy, supra, note 56.
" Williams v. Longly, supra, note 56.Ohio Gen. Code 11495.
"1Jackson v. Ely, 57 Ohio St. 450, 49 N.E. 79z (i898); Miller v. Faust, 19 Ohio
L. Abq. 42 (1935), Whitehead v. Parsons, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 274 (1934).
G'l Jackson v. Ely, supra, note 6x.
" Stream v. Barnard, suara, McNaughton v. Presbyterian Church, 35 Ohio App. 443,
172 N.E. 561, 33 Ohio L. Rep. 66 (1930).
c' Runyan v. Price, iS Ohio St. x, 86 Am. Dec. 459 (x864).
Latham v. Clark, izo Ohio St. 559, 166 N.E. 685 (1929).
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rendered such deceased, the same as if he had lived and were a
party to the action."5
(5) "In an action or proceeding by or against a partner or
joint contractor, the adverse party shall not testify to trans-
actions with, or admissions by, a partner or joint contractor
since deceased, unless they were made in the presence of the
surviving partner or joint contractor. This rule applies without
regard to the character in which the parties sue or are sued." 6
The party is not totally excluded as a witness for he is compe-
tent to testify as to acts done or statements made, by the
deceased in the presence of the survivor." This section does
not make a co-maker of a note a competent witness in an action
thereon by the executor of the payee, to testify to transactions
giving rise to the note for the fact situation is not within the
exception.68 It does not matter whether the action is against the
survivor alone or against him and the representative of the
deceased partner jointly, for testimony competent or incompe-
tent against one is likewise competent or incompetent against
the other." And it has been held "if the witness be allowed to
state admissions made, or acts done, by the decedent, in presence
of the surviving partner, there is no reason for excluding his
testimony as to acts done, or admissions made, by the surviving
partner himself.""
(6) "If the claim or defense is founded on a book account,
a party may testify that the book is his account book, that it is
a book of original entries, that the entries therein were made in
the regular course -of business by himself, a person since de-
ceased, or a disinterested person. The book shall then be com-
petent evidence in any case, without regard to the parties, upon
like proof by any competent witness."'" Cash items of money
paid or loaned are not the proper subject-matter of a book
account,7 2 nor are the stubs in a book of promissory notes," nor
items which have passed into judgment,' nor those entered but
66 Ohio Gen. Code 11495.
17 Schlarman v. Heyn, i9 Ohio App. 64. (1923); See Baxter v. Leith for application
of the exception, z8 Ohio St. 84 (1875).
"8 Crawford v. Jones, i5 Ohio L. Abs. 719 (1933)-
" SeA larman v. Heyn, supra, note 67.
7
* Harrison v. Neely, 41 Ohio St. 334 (1884).
"' Ohio Gen. Code 11495.
7' Hough v. Henk, 8 Ohio C.C. 354, 4 Ohio C.D. 69 (1894); Page and Ballard v.
Zehring, 8 Ohio Dec. Rep. 2zx, 6 Bull. 299 (x88x); Kennedy v. Dodge, 19 Ohio CC.
425, Ia Ohio C.D. 36o (1899).
73 Mathias Planing Mill Co. v. Hazen & Co., 2o Ohio C.C. z87, i i C.D. 54
(igoo)i Watts v. Shewell, 31 Ohio St. 331 (1877)-
"' Smiley v. Dewey, 7 Ohio x56 (84-8).
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once a year.7" If the entry is of a large sum of money it is
improper as a book account76 as also are payments on a note."'
The book must be one of original entries. 8 Thus the cash book
of a firm is competent as evidence of the payment by a deceased
husband of his deceased wife's debt to the firm or other cred-
itors." But if the day book is destroyed, the ledger is compe-
tent." Where one party introduces a part of a book account the
other may introduce the remainder." A party offering a book
of accounts may be questioned as to his habits of making mis-
takes." The force and effect of a book of accounts as evidence
cannot be determined by the court of appeals where no account
book was offered in evidence below. 3
(7) "If after testifying orally a party dies, the evidence
may be proved by either party on a further trial of the case,
whereupon the opposite party may testify as to the same mat-
ters."' In such a case there is no reason to make the opposite
party incompetent for there is no danger of fraud." The excep-
tion refers to former testimony taken in the same suit and not
to testimony given in another proceeding in another court
although between the same parties.86 "Opposite party" refers
to the party opposing the deceased person and his successor in
interest, not to the party opposing the one offering the testi-
mony.
(8) "If a party dies and his deposition be offered in evi-
dence, the opposite party may testify as to all competent matters
therein.""8 The deposition of a party taken during the pendency
of the suit is not admissible on the trial when the opposite party
has since deceased," even though the witness may have been
competent at the time the deposition was taken. " Although the
adverse party may introduce such testimony into evidence in
" Bogert v. Cox, 4 Ohio CC. z8g, z Ohio C.D. SSI (z890).
70 Page and Ballard v. Zehring, supra, note 7z.
Kennedy v. Dodge, supra, note 72.
7
"Baxter v. Leith, 28 Ohio St. 84 (1875); Bennett v. Shaw, xz Ohio C.C. 574, £
Ohio C.D. 480 (x896).
7 0 Miller v. McLean, zx Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 424, 21 Ohio C.D. 64 (1go8).
8
'Burr v. Shute, z Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 343, 14 Ohio C.D. 6z (z9oz); see also Ken-
nedy v. Dodge, supra, note 72.
Stillwater Turnpike Co. v. Coover, 25 Ohio St. 558 (1874).
s Sheridan v. Tenner, 5 Ohio C.C. 19, 3 Ohio C.D. io (x890).
' Brink v. Berne, 29 Ohio App. 59, z6z N.E. 779,6 Ohio L. Abs. 661 (1928).
s' Ohio Gen. Code. 11495.
s Maithews v. Heider, z2 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 399 (1912).
'6 Conett v. Squair, 17 Ohio D. (N.P.) 6S, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 558 (igo6).
7 Mathews v. Heider, supra, note 8S.
s' Ohio Gen. Code 11495.
soSt. Clair v. Orr, x6 Ohio St. 220 (1865); Neville v. Rambo, z Ohio Dec. Rep.
768 (x857).
'o Bettman v. Hunt, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 396 (1883); Neville v. Hambo, supra.
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his own behalf, he cannot do so for the purpose of making his
own testimony competent to contradict it." The taking and
filing of a deposition of the adverse party which is not offered
in evidence at the trial of the case does not waive the statutory
inhibition against the testimony of the party whose testimony is
so taken and filed. Prior to the enactment of the statute in its
present form it was held that it was not competent for a repre-
sentative party to prove upon the trial what was testified to by
his intestate on a former trial, for, as the code only permited the
adverse party, in such a case, to testify as to facts which tran-
spired during the life of the intestate when the deposition of
the deceased party had been taken the evidence of the intestate
could only be received by medium of a deposition.9"
The statute is concluded by the following statement:
"Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for causing death,
or actions or proceedings involving the validity of a deed, will,
or codicil; and when a case is plainly within the reason and
spirit of the next three preceding sections, though not within
the strict letter, their principles shall be applied."9 The exclu-
sion of wrongful death actions was meant to enable the de-
fendant in such a case to testify where the administrator is the
adverse party." In an interesting case, the plaintiff brought
action for personal injuries wherein the defendant adminis-
trator by cross-petition sought judgment for the wrongful death
of his intestate but during the trial submitted to dismissal of
the cross-petition. In a dictum the court observed that had the
cause been submitted upon the issues made on the cross-petition,
then the testimony of the plaintiff would have been competent
on those issues; but even then the court must instruct the jury
not to consider the testimony of the plaintiff upon the issues
made on the petition.96 The exemption does not apply to a
personal injury action against the party representing the person
causing the injury,97 nor does it seem to apply where the injured
person died from other causes after the accident.98
Actions involving the validity of a deed, will or codicil are
also excluded. In such a case the parties are not in privity with
the deceased and no evidence is lost." Such an action must be
" Conett v. Sqaair, sapra, note 86.
"
2 Prince v.Abersold, 123 Ohio St. 464, 175 N.E. 86z (193).3 Hoover v. Jennings, I Ohio St. 624 (186o).
, Ohio Gen. Code, 22495.
o Ransom v. Haberer, supra, note zs.
"
9 Barber v. Kihlken, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 599 (1934)-97 Ransom v. Haberer, supra, note z5.
98 CoxV. Waltz, 13 Ohio L.Abs. 364 (1932).
Wolf v. Powner, sapra, note xo.
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one involving the legal sufficiency of such instrument and a
party may testify only as to circumstances directly bearing upon
the legal sufficiency of the deed which is attacked.' Therefore,
an action to construe a will'.. or to enforce a trust upon a will
or deed would not be an action involving the validity of such
deed or will.0 2 It does not matter that the action is for money
only if the determination of the right to the money involves
the validity of a deed.'' Of course, an action to set aside a deed
is one involving its validity."
The final "reason and spirit" clause is somewhat trouble-
some. It applies not only to this section but to the two preced-
ing ones also and therefore to warrant its application the case
must be plainly within the reason and spirit of I 1493 which
makes all persons competent as a general rule.' It can apply
only when the case is not provided for by either of these sec-
tions.'. for if provision therefor is made in any one of the three
sections there can be no occasion for the application of the "rea-
son and spirit" clause." 7 Thus this clause should not exclude
the testimony of one who is not a necessary party. 8 The court
has refused to use this provision to render incompetent the testi-
mony of the plaintiff in an action for services rendered a corpo-
ration although the officer employing plaintiff had died.' And
in an action by the vendor, an agent is competent although the
vendee has died."' As interpreted in the foregoing cases, the
"reason and spirit" clause has been of little practical signifi-
cance. Since it must be interpreted in the light of section 1 1493
making all persons competent generally, then all persons not
specifically excepted would be competent and provided for by
the statute. However, in a more recent case, (although the
court disagreed), the writer of the opinion contended that the
former view was an erroneous one and the clause was meant to
do away with absolute particularity; and so the fact that a
'
0
°Reiger v. Hotel Reiger Co., z4 Ohio St. z52, 177 N.E. 2Z1, 34 Ohio L. Rep. 478
(1931).
M" iller v. Miller, supra, note 29.
'" Paddock v. Adamrs, 56 Ohio St. 242, 46 N.E. io68 (1897).
" Tootle v. Lane, i2 Ohio L. Abs. 273 (193z).
'"'Murdock v. Neely, i Ohio C.C. 6, Ohio C.D. 9 (i885)5 Doney v. Dunnick's
Adm'r., 8 Ohio C.C. 163, 4 Ohio C.D. xSo (1894).
"" Stcrnbcrger v. Hanna, 4z Ohio St. 305 (1884); sec. 5240 corresponds to present
sc. 11493.
", Powell v. Powell, 78 Ohio St. 331 (1908).
" Milling Co. v. Bonn, 7S Ohio St. Z70, 79 N.E. 478 (i9o6); Loney v. Walkey,
io Ohio St. x8 (i92i); Cochran v. Alrnack, 39 Ohio St. 314 (1883).
"' Ryan v. O'Connor, 41 Ohio St. 368 (1884)5 Hess v. Clutz, 8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
Sz, 8 Ohio App. 57 (1917)-
' Vulcan Corp. v. Hanzel, 37 Ohio App. 75, 174 N.E. 146 (1930).
Uo Shaubv. Srnith, So Ohio St. 648, 35 N.E. 03 (1893).
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husband caused a grant to be made directly to his wife from
the original owner did not prevent her from being the "gran-
tee" of her husband in view of this clause."'
From a review of the various clauses of this statute and
their interpretation by the courts, it is evident that a great deal
of litigation has resulted and that certainty of construction has
not yet been achieved. The objections that were made to the
competency of an interested party at common law can still be
made to this statute. It eliminates considerable relevant testi-
mony which would otherwise be admissible. It attempts to
strike a rough balance by dosing the mouth of one interested
party when death has silenced the other. That it does strike
such a balance and that it does keep out testimony which often
would be biased and occasionally perjured is clear. But justifi-
cation for such a statute must rest upon the conclusion that more
harm would be done by the admissibility of this kind of testi-
mony than by barring what is often the only adequate means
of proof. That the framers of the statute were none too sure
of this conclusion is evident from the several exceptions that
were grafted upon it.
Numerous statements of a deceased party may be used in
the trial. These statements would be hearsay because made
before this trial and offered to prove the truth of those state-
ments, but on one ground or another would be admissible as
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The statute provides that if
statements are used such as admissions (Exception 4), account
books (Exception 6), testimony in former trial (Exception 7),
or depositions (Exception 8), the living party is authorized to
testify freely on the subject matter. It is suggested that this
approach might well be extended as has been done in some
states that all hearsay statements of the deceased 1 2 or perhaps
all written hearsay of the deceased," 3 whether otherwise ad-
missible or not, be received in evidence, and on the other hand
the surviving party be made competent to testify in all re-
spects."
11' Newman v. Newman, 103 Ohio St. 230 (192).
2a Mass. St. x889 C. 535, Gen. L. 19zo, C. 233 Article 65; See also for a more lim-
ited statute, Oregon: St. 1893, P. 134, Laws x92o, Article 732. See Wigmore, supra, Sec.
Ca conn: Gen. St. 1918, Article 5735
114 There are three ways now being used to allow the testimony and still have safe-
guards. (i) Oregon and New Mexico allow no recovery in such cases on the party's sole
testimony. (z) Connecticut, Virginia, and Oregon admit as well as the testimony of the
surviving party any declarations of the deceased party on the subject in issue. (3) New
Hampshire and Arizona exclude the testimony except when it "appears to the court that
injustice may be done without the testimony of the party." See Wigmore, supra, sec. 578.
